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This paper examines the proposals listed by the President of the European Council, 
Donald Tusk, in response to the letter sent by the British Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, asking for a fresh settlement concerning the United Kingdom’s relationship 
with the European Union. The paper reviews the nature and possible consequences 
of the “substantial changes” that were demanded in the areas of economic 
governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. 
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In June 2016, the United Kingdom will hold a referendum to “settle” the issue of its 
membership of the European Union for the “next generation”. It is not unusual for 
Member States to put to plebiscite important developments in their relations with the 
Union, as for example, in Denmark in 1992 and 1993, France and the Netherlands in 
2005 and Ireland in 2008 and 2009. 
 
The British people will be asked whether they agree or not with the new 
arrangements that still have to be negotiated with the Union and the other Member 
States. On 10 November 2015, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, sent a 
letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, outlining the issues 
where the UK wanted reforms in order to “address the concerns of the British 
people”. His proposals for reform were grouped in four categories: Economic 
governance, competitiveness, sovereignty and immigration. Mr Cameron then 
embarked on a tour of European capitals to drum up support for his ideas and 
demands. 
 
On 2 February 2015, after multiple meetings, Mr Tusk submitted a draft Decision for 
the Heads of State or Government to be approved at a meeting on 18 February 
2016. A revised version of the draft Decision was circulated on 11 February 2016. Mr 
Cameron was reported to be very much in favour of the draft Decision. To reach an 
agreement in the space of barely two and half months is a remarkable feat. 
 
The structure of the draft Decision mirrors the categories of reform outlined in 
Mr Cameron’s letter. Apart from a preamble and a concluding section on application 
and final provisions, the draft Decision is also divided in sections entitled economic 
governance, competitiveness, and sovereignty. But perhaps tellingly, the penultimate 
section is entitled “social benefits and free movement”, instead of “immigration”. 
 
If the draft Decision is adopted by the European Council, it will not only signify 
a success for Mr Cameron, but also have substantial repercussions for the rest of 
the Union. One thing is clear: not only will it reshape the relations between the UK 
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and the EU, but it will also change how the EU operates, not necessarily for the 
better. 
 
In this short paper, we review the proposals tabled by Mr Tusk, identify the issues 
that are likely to be contentious and consider their impact. In his November letter, 
Mr Cameron wrote that “our concerns really boil down to one word: flexibility” and he 
hoped that “reforms would provide a fresh and lasting settlement for our membership 
of the European Union”. The questions now are what is the likely cost of that 
flexibility and how will it affect the membership of other countries. 
 
Preamble: Membership is not a uniform straitjacket 
 
The preamble explains that Member States have considerable leeway with respect 
to how extensively they are involved in defence matters, common border controls 
and fighting crime. More broadly, the procedure of “enhanced cooperation” does 
allow like-minded Member States to deepen their links without obliging all others to 
join them. 
 
The preamble also makes it clear that in fact the UK already has a “flexible” and, in 
some respects, privileged membership. Several recitals summarise exceptions 
enjoyed by the UK: 
 No obligation to adopt the euro [Protocol 15]; 
 Opt-out from the Schengen acquis [Protocols 19 & 20]; 
 Choice of whether to adopt measures in the area of freedom, security and justice 
[Protocol 21]; 
 Exception from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice with respect to 
fundamental rights [Protocol 30]; 
 Choice of whether to apply measures in the area of police and judicial 
cooperation [Protocol 36]. 
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Economic governance: Warm but fuzzy words 
 
The first part of this section focuses on “respect”. It stresses that Eurozone countries 
will “respect” the rights of non-participating countries, while the latter will not create 
obstacles to deeper integration in the Eurozone. Then the draft Decision goes on to 
refer to “mutual respect” and to “respect” for the internal market and economic and 
social cohesion as well as the prohibition of discrimination. 
Hardly anyone can object to the requests for the respect of rights and of the internal 
market. Perhaps the draft Decision recalls the fundamental principle of non-
discrimination because recently the European Court of Justice concluded that the 
ECB had exceeded its powers when it required counter-party clearing houses to be 
located in the Eurozone.1 The UK claimed that that amounted to discrimination on 
the grounds of location. The Court of Justice did not get to adjudicate on this point 
but the ECB would have had a hard time demonstrating that it was not possible to 
find a less restrictive means of exercising its supervisory powers and that it was 
absolutely necessary for counter-party clearing houses to be located within the 
Eurozone. 
 
The unprecedented introduction of capital controls in Cyprus in 2013 and in Greece 
in 2015 impacted to varying degrees all Member States. From the British 
perspective, a crisis within the Eurozone was partly contained with an instrument that 
impeded capital movement between those two countries and the rest of the single 
market. 
 
An addition contained in the revised draft Decision differentiates between Member 
States with a permanent opt-out from the Economic and Monetary Union and those 
that are supposed to adopt the euro as soon as they fulfil the required conditions. 
The emphasis on the latter’s commitment “under the Treaties to make progress 
towards fulfilling the conditions” for joining the Eurozone stems from the worry of 
some Member States that eurosceptic governments could claim that they no longer 
have the legal obligation to join the bloc. 
 
                                                          
1 UK v ECB, Case T-496/11. 
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The draft Decision also mentions that “any difference in treatment must be based on 
objective reasons”. Internal market rules do allow restrictions on free movement 
when they are objectively justified. For example, a product that harms human health 
is objectively different from other innocuous products and therefore its trade may be 
restricted. It is not clear how objective differentiation is understood in the context of 
the draft Decision. 
 
The second part states that EU law, including its application by the European Central 
Bank and the Single Resolution Board, is to be conceived “in a more uniform 
manner” than corresponding rules applied by national authorities of non-Eurozone 
countries. For this purpose, changes of the single rulebook “may be necessary”. This 
rather vague wording does not hide the intention of the EU to limit the regulatory 
freedom of the UK in the field of financial services. Possible changes of the single 
rulebook are mentioned in order to maintain enough legal space for a future 
deepening of Eurozone integration. 
 
It is conceivable that the UK is concerned about moves by the ECB to establish the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism as the common oversight framework also for 
securities markets in the Eurozone. During the negotiations on the structure of the 
banking union, the UK secured a special double-majority voting procedure within the 
European Banking Authority. A simple majority of non-Eurozone countries can stall 
decision-making within the EBA. A demand for extension of this double-majority rule 
to European Securities Markets Authority and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority may surface after a deal in the European Council. 
 
Part three requires that the costs of any crisis measures to safeguard the euro will 
not be borne by countries outside the Eurozone. This is at first glance quite fair. 
However, given the rather high degree of integration of both the financial sector and 
the real economy across the EU, any measure that supports the euro and resolves 
crises eventually benefits all Member States, not just the Eurozone countries. Some 
burden sharing is, therefore, not unreasonable. 
 
It is also important to note that arrangements that address this concern have already 
been found. The additional financial assistance granted to Greece last year sparked 
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fears in the UK that its taxpayers could be held liable for Eurozone bailouts. 
However, a joint Declaration by the Commission and the Council then specified a 
safeguard for non-Eurozone countries. In case the debtor country would not be able 
to repay any loans, there would be immediate reimbursements of the non-Eurozone 
countries. The Declaration was followed by appropriate adjustments of the relevant 
legal instruments. 
 
Part four specifies that the supervision and resolution of banks in the non-Eurozone 
countries is a matter for those countries. Well, this is not correct. The single rulebook 
developed by the European Banking Authority applies to all Member States. So does 
the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive. Moreover, all cases of restructuring 
and resolution of banks are subject to State aid rules which are common to all 
Member States. Indeed, immediately afterwards in the draft Decision it is recognised 
that the autonomy of non-Eurozone countries is “without prejudice” to Union 
mechanisms on oversight and stability. 
 
Part five asks the Eurogroup – the gathering of Eurozone ministers of finance – to 
respect the powers of the Council. Here the draft Decision implicitly acknowledges 
the tension between the Eurogroup and the Ecofin Council – the gathering of 
ministers of economics and finance from all Member States. Certainly, there has 
been friction which should be resolved. This proposal seeks to mitigate British fears 
that the in-built majority of Eurozone Member States in the Ecofin Council since 1 
November 2014 will render non-Eurozone Member States powerless in influencing 
future financial rules. Understandably, the UK does want to have a say in financial 
services regulation, given that the City is an important sector of the UK economy. 
 
Part six refers to the right of any Member State to have issues covered by the draft 
Decision discussed within the European Council. This section is a watered down 
version of the demand of the UK for a right of appeal against Eurozone-specific 
legislation. Still, this could lead to a slowing down of the legislative process, even 
though Part six explicitly refers to the need that the “urgency of the matter” be taken 
into account. 
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At the end of this section, a bracketed sentence states that “the substance of this 
Section will be incorporated into the Treaties at the time of their next revision”. The 
fact that it is bracketed indicates that views are divided as to whether the reforms 
can be implemented and secured without Treaty revision. 
 
This section supposedly addresses one of Mr Cameron’s strongest demands: that 
integration in the Eurozone should not disadvantage the UK and other non-Eurozone 
countries. Yet, apart from conceding that rules in the Eurozone should be conceived 
in a more uniform manner, it says nothing else than what already emanates from the 
general principles of EU law. 
 
This is a greatly missed opportunity because this section should have made a crucial 
distinction between discrimination against non-Eurozone countries [which should be 
prohibited] and the disadvantage of non-Eurozone countries from keeping their own 
currency and rules [which is an inevitable consequence of further integration of the 
Eurozone]. For example, the establishment of the ECB as the single supervisory 
authority in the Eurozone is intended to improve the effectiveness of regulation of 
banks with cross-border operations. As such, it may strengthen the stability of the 
Eurozone financial system and consequently make it more attractive to foreign 
banks. The establishment of the Single Resolution Board may make resolution of 
banks with international operations more predictable because just one authority will 
be responsible. At the same time, the Single Resolution Fund will be larger than 
national resolution funds and, if bank failure in different countries is not correlated, 
the SRF’s larger size may enable it to withstand more failures. This in itself will make 
the Eurozone a safer place for investment. All these changes may disadvantage the 
UK by tilting the competitive field in favour of the Eurozone without, however, overtly 
or covertly discriminating against UK banks. 
 
It is also possible, however, that certain changes in the Eurozone may prove to be to 
the advantage of the UK. For example, resolution of banks in the Eurozone will be 
institutionally and procedurally more complex. Decisions will have to be taken by the 
SRB together with national authorities and approved by the Commission. By 
contrast, resolution in non-Eurozone countries will be simpler because any national 
authority will have to obtain the approval only of the Commission and not of other 
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national authorities or a supranational body, such as the SRB. In general, integration 
in the Eurozone has created new layers of bureaucracy which have an impact on 
operational efficiency. 
 
The UK will unavoidably be affected by and may also benefit from deeper integration 
in the Eurozone by virtue of its extensive ties to the Eurozone economies. But it is 
impossible and rather nonsensical for any country to seek to reap the benefits of 
integration without accepting also the possibility that there may be disadvantageous 
developments which are not caused by discrimination. 
 
Competitiveness: Nothing new 
 
This section is the least imaginative. It demands that “the EU must enhance 
competitiveness”. EU institutions and Member States are exhorted to “make all 
efforts to fully implement and strengthen the internal market”, “take concrete steps 
towards better regulation”, lower “administrative burdens and compliance costs on 
economic operators”, repeal “unnecessary legislation” and pursue “an active and 
ambitious trade”. 
 
Nonetheless, this wording clarifies the importance of the single market for all of the 
EU. It may help the UK government to gain support back home for the eventual 
outcome of the negotiations. Certainly, no Treaty changes are needed to achieve 
these objectives which have been repeated in numerous European Council 
conclusions. 
 
Sovereignty: Less flexibility in the name of democracy 
 
The first part of this section offers an extensive interpretation of the objective of “ever 
closer union” that appears in the preamble and Article 1 of the Treaty on the 
European Union. According to the draft Decision, this objective does not imply 
further political integration but rather better trust and understanding among the 
peoples of Europe. As the draft Decision points out, further integration is neither 
automatic, nor unavoidable. At any rate, any extension of the competences of the EU 
must follow established procedures and is tempered by the principles of conferral, 
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subsidiarity, and proportionality. The draft Decision recognizes that the UK “is not 
committed to further political integration”. The commitment to include a 
corresponding provision in the Treaties remains in square brackets, meaning that the 
“formal, legally-binding and irreversible” change requested by Mr Cameron will not 
be achieved any time soon. But it may simply not be necessary as the Treaties in 
their current form already provide sufficient flexibility. 
 
Part two states that “reasoned opinions” issued by national Parliaments in 
accordance with Article 7(1) of Protocol 2 on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality should be “duly taken into account” by EU institutions 
and that “appropriate arrangements” will be made to that effect. No more specific 
mention is made regarding the nature of those arrangements. It should be recalled 
that Article 7(1) already requires that the opinions of national Parliaments are taken 
into account, so the proposal simply reiterates the status quo.  
 
Part three directly responds to Mr Cameron’s demand for more power of national 
parliaments by strengthening the procedure laid down in Article 7(3) of Protocol 2. 
The British prime minister has repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
existing “yellow” and “orange” card procedures established by Article 7(2 & 3).2 
When at least a third or a half of national parliaments object to a legislative proposal, 
Article 7(2 & 3) imposes an obligation on the decision-making institutions to 
“maintain, amend or withdraw” legislative proposals. In case they are maintained, 
they have to be justified. 
 
According to the draft Decision, if 55% of national parliaments objects to a legislative 
proposal within 12 weeks of its transmission, then the Council will have to abandon it 
unless it is appropriately amended. Such a real “red card” mechanism arguably 
                                                          
2
 The “yellow card” and “orange card” procedures constitute a part of the Subsidiarity Control 
Mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The different mechanisms define the formal effects of 
reasoned opinions issued by national Parliaments on the legislative procedure. According to Protocol 
2, each Member State has two votes. The “yellow card” procedure is triggered by a reasoned decision 
supported by at least one third (or one fourth in the area of freedom, security and justice) of the votes. 
The “orange card” procedure requires a simple majority of the votes if the draft is submitted under the 
ordinary legislative procedure. 
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offers more time to gather the necessary support and improves the current system of 
eight weeks which makes it virtually impossible for national parliaments to act within 
the short time frame. 
 
While the new mechanism may be more useful to national parliaments, its overall 
effectiveness as a means of strengthening democratic legitimacy is doubtful. The 
proposal appears at first glance to make the EU more responsive to the views of the 
people as expressed through their elected representatives. When more than half of 
national parliaments raise objections, one cannot but accept that they do reflect the 
will of the majority. However, it is more likely that the new procedure will only add to 
the maze of mechanisms that are already in place but rarely used3, having a 
potentially negative impact on the speed and efficiency of EU decision-making. How 
such an arrangement would introduce more “flexibility” is difficult to fathom.  
 
The fact that the existing “yellow” and “orange” card arrangements are rarely invoked 
suggests that a new arrangement may in fact be unnecessary. Out of the 28 Member 
States, 27 have political systems whereby the government is formed by the party or 
coalition that commands majority in parliament. It is unlikely that the majority of these 
governments would support a legislative proposal in the Council while a majority of 
the parties or coalitions they represent would oppose it in national parliaments. 
 
Parts four and five restate well-known principles that protocols are an integral part of 
the Treaties and that national security is the sole responsibility of Member States. 
 
Social benefits and free movement: Safeguards for all? 
 
This section first reminds us that free movement of workers is a fundamental feature 
of the internal market. It explains that workers move precisely because levels of 
remuneration differ between Member States. Indeed, labour movement that reduces 
                                                          
3
 So far, the “yellow card” procedure has been initiated in two cases: in relation to the proposed 
Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (2012); and in relation to the Council 
Regulation on the European Public Prosecutor’s office (2013). No “orange card” procedures have 
been triggered.  
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wage differentials is a natural consequence of the market dynamics. More 
importantly, reduction in wage differentials is beneficial to all countries in the long 
run, despite the fact that some workers lose out. 
 
Then the draft Decision goes on to state that differences in the social security 
systems of the Member States may induce labour movement which is not “a natural 
consequence of a well-functioning market”. However, the extent to which people 
move in order to exploit  social security differences is an empirical issue. Even if it 
happens, there is no clear evidence that it is substantial. 
 
But the draft Decision acknowledges that “it is legitimate to take this situation into 
account and to provide, both at Union and at national level, and without creating 
unjustified direct or indirect discrimination, for measures avoiding or limiting flows of 
workers of such a scale that they have negative effects both for the Member States 
of origin and for the Member States of destination.” This favours measures that can 
be applied to all Member States, not just the UK. 
 
Then Part one of this section provides an interpretation of current EU rules on labour 
movement. It recalls that Member States have the right to define their own social 
security systems and also that the right of movement under Article 45 TFEU is not 
absolute. It is limited on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, 
which are specified in the Treaty, and by overriding reasons of public interest, which 
have been identified in the case law. In fact, recent judgments of the Court of Justice 
have reiterated that Member States may impose restrictions for the purpose of 
ensuring a real connection between workers and host countries and for preventing 
persons without rights of residence from becoming an excessive burden on social 
security systems. Member States are also free to take action to prevent the abuse of 
rights or fraudulent claims. 
 
Part two proposes changes to EU legislation with respect to i) the exportation and 
indexing of child benefits, ii) the establishment of an “alert and safeguard 
mechanism” in case of inflows of “exceptional magnitude” over an “extended period” 
of time. Member States will have to notify the Commission and the Council that an 
“exceptional situation” exists and that it leads to “serious” difficulties or to “excessive 
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pressure” on their public services. Then the Council may authorise Member States to 
restrict access to welfare benefits to the “extent necessary” and to limit the access of 
new workers for a period of up to four years, with one or two extensions. 
 
These proposals are intended to apply to all Member States and not just to allow for 
privileged treatment of the UK. This in itself is a sound approach and avoids creating 
first and second class Member States. The proposals are heavily qualified. 
Safeguards will become operational only in exceptional situations and will be only 
temporary. 
 
While indexing child benefits in accordance with the country of residence of the child 
is a reasonable proposal that gives fewer incentives to parents to leave children 
behind, restricting in-work benefits will create a differential treatment between 
nationals and non-nationals. So far, EU legislation and the case law allow for 
restrictions of non-contributory benefits for non-nationals who do not try to integrate 
in the labour market, and therefore, protect the social security systems of individual 
Member States. This approach is reasonable. The same can be argued about 
access to social housing. But restricting in-work benefits goes a step further.  
 
As the name suggests, in-work benefits are granted to individuals who have taken up 
a full-time or a part-time job. The scope of these benefits is to increase the difference 
between in-work income and out-of-work income by raising the net income from 
work. Increasing the minimum working period for non-nationals before they are 
entitled to in-work benefits is equivalent to paying lower salaries based on 
nationality. Will this be an effective measure to discourage workers from other EU 
countries from going to the UK? Not necessarily. First, as long as the wage 
differences across countries are high enough, some workers will surely move. 
Second, while restricting in-work benefits could reduce public expenditure of the 
receiving country, it may also increase demand for out-of-work benefits if the 
difference between working income and non-working support becomes smaller and 
out-of-work benefits access is not restricted for the same period. Third, less 
favourable treatment of foreign workers may have a more pronounced negative 
impact on high-skilled foreign professionals and discourage those workers that the 
UK wishes to attract. 




Even if Member States would agree to these proposals, the new safeguard 
mechanisms will apply only to new arrivals. Existing migrant workers from other 
Member States will not be affected. It remains to be seen whether this is acceptable 
to the UK. 
 
The application of the safeguards will not be automatic. The Commission and the 
Council will have to interpret what “exceptional”, “extended period”, “excessive 
pressure” and “serious difficulties” mean. Opinions are bound to differ and divergent 
interpretations will be a source of friction in the future. Unless people stop moving in 
large numbers, the problem will not be truly solved even if Member States agree to 




The draft Decision has already performed a useful function by showing that much of 
what the UK has asked for already exists in one form or another. However, the inter-
governmental method that mobilised all EU Member States in order to negotiate 
particular concerns of the UK also shows the strength and influence of the UK within 
the EU. 
 
Additional measures, procedures, and safeguards will not necessarily improve the 
functioning of the European Union. Ironically, there is a significant risk that they will 
make it less flexible. Safeguards will not apply automatically, even if they can be 
invoked by any Member State. Agreeing to implement them will also be highly 
contentious. 
 
Will failure of the UK to secure these changes in the forthcoming negotiations be 
worth leaving the EU? One only hopes that UK voters will conclude that the answer 
is no. However, it will not be surprising if they still vote in favour of exit from the EU, 
simply because they perceive a “fresh settlement” as a sham. 
 
 
